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and determined that an "emission standard" is intended to be a quantitative limit
on emissions, not a "work practice"
standard. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist disregarded the fact
emissions are impossible
quantitatively. The history
tion demonstrates that the
standard was chosen by the

that asbestos
to measure
of the regulawork practice

of criminal proceedings, Congress has the
power to require that the validity of a
regulatory action be challenged in a particular court at a particular time, or not at
all. However, Justice Rehnquist views the
statutory provisions of the Emergency
Price Control Act considered under Yakus

Administrator

as a "relatively simple statutory scheme"
in contrast with the Clean Air Act's "far

after it became clear that he could not
prohibit all visible emissions of asbestos

more complex inter-relationships between
the imposition of criminal sanctions and

without destroying an entire industry.
Furthermore, while numerical standards
are preferred by Congress, the statute
contains no express requirement that
standards always be framed in numerical

judicial review of the Administrator's actions." There is nothing ambiguous,

terms; nor has Congress expressed an
overriding interest in using such terms
when a less drastic control technique is
available.
The majority also relied on the rule that
"where there is ambiguity in a criminal
statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the
defendant." United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336,348 (1971). But in Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S.1,16, (1965) the Court
held that "[w]hen faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration. 'To sustain the application of the statutory term
[as applied by the agency], we need not
find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result
we would have reached had the question
arisen in the first instance in judicial ptoceedings.' "
Looking again to the statutory scheme,
Justice Rehnquist believed that the
Government was not relieved of its duty
to prove that the allegedly violated
regulation is an "emission standard" even
though § 307(b)(2) precludes judicial
review of the validity of emission standards. Under §307(b)(1), though, this
regulation could have been reviewed only

vague or difficult in § 307(b). Its intent
that a petition for review of an action of
the Administrator in promulgating any
emission standard may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit could hardly
be more obvious. Congress has clearly expressed that "any review of such actions"
be controlled by the provisions of §
307(b) .4 Additionally, the Adamo opinion
fails to adequately express the alleged inequities which would arise as a result of
adherence to the Act's venue requirements in the current "complex" situation.
The majority's interpretation of an
"emission standard" denies the Administrator the authority to effectively regulate
the emission of asbestos, a poisonous substance which poses an especially grave
threat to human health. Their interpretation of the plain statutory language of §
307(b) frustrates the intent of Congress to
establish a unified and expedient system
of judicial review under the Clean Air Act.
In the words of Justice Stewart, who dissented along with Justices Brennan,
Blackmun and Stevens, "the Court today
has allowed the camel's nose into the tent,
and I fear that the rest of the camel is
almost certain to follow."

by Roxane Nass Sokolove

On January 10, 1978, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that
an unwed father's substantive due process
rights were not violated by a Georgia
statute which denied him the authority to
prevent the adoption of his illegitimate
child. Nor was the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment violated
by the distinction made in the Georgia
statute between the rights of fathers of
legitimate children and the rights of
fathers of illegitimate children.
Although the unwed father may have as
great a personal interest in his child as a
married father has in his child, the unwed
father must establish that interest in law
by either marrying the mother of his
children and recognizing the offspring of
the illicit relationship, or legitimizing the
children as provided by statute. The
authority to then bar the adoption of the
children stems from this legally established interest.
In Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S. Ct. 549
(1978), therefore, the absence of such
legal status, and the Court's application of
the "best interests of the child" standard
and recognition of the state's interest in
child rearing by a family unit were the
vehicles used to defeat the asserted constitutional rights of an unwed father.
In December, 1964, a child was born
from the illicit relationship of Ardell

'S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p.41 (1970)

in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, and because of this express

Williams, appellee, and Leon Webster
Quilloin, appellant. The child's mother
and natural father never married nor lived
together as a family. In September, 1967,
Ardell Williams married Randall Walcott,
appellee. The following March, Randall

language, Adamo should have been barred from raising the issue before any other
court.
The majority distinguishes Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944),
where the Court held that in the context

Walcott, with the consent of the child's
mother, filed a petition to adopt the child.
.1
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Quilloin seek custody or object to the
child's continuing to live with appellees.
In opposing the adoption and attempting to gain vistation rights and legitimize
the child, Quilloin argued that Ga. Code
Ann. § 74-203, placing all parental power
in the mother of an illegitimate child, and
Ga. Code Ann. § 74-403(3), requiring
only her consent for an illegitimate child's
adoption, are unconstitutional.
The trial court, in granting Walcott's
petition

for

adoption

and

denying

Quilloin's petition for legitimation and
visitation rights, based its decision on the
"best interest of the child" standard. The
factors used in determining whether or
not the standard was met included:

Prior to the time Randall Walcott filed
his petition for adoption, Leon Quilloin,
the natural father, had never attempted to
legitimize the child by marrying Ardell,
recognize the child as his and file a petition for legitimation, or obtain visitation
rights, all of which are prescribed methods
of legitimization under Ga. Code Ann. §§
74-101, 74-103. It was not until the stepfather filed the adoption petition that
Leon Quilloin, in attempting to block the
adoption tried to secure visitation rights.
It is also significant that at no time did
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1. Quilloin's failure to provide support
for the child on a regular basis;
2. Ardell's custody of the child for the
child's entire life;
3. The marriage of Randall Walcott
and Ardell Williams Walcott;
4. The disruptive effect of Quilloin's
erratic contacts with the child on both
the child and on Walcott's entire
family;
5. The child's expression of desire to
be adopted by Walcott and take on
Walcott's name.
98 S.Ct. at 552-553.
The "best interest of the child" standard has been applied in custody cases of
both legitimate and illegitimate children.
("The cardinal principle that the welfare
of the child should determine its custody
is applicable to legitimate as well as illegitimate children." 10 Am.Jur.2d.
Bastards § 60.) In 1879, a Michigan Court
in Corrie v. Corrie, 42 Mich. 509, 510, 4
N.W. 213, 214, declared: "neither of the
parties has any rights that can be allowed
to seriously militate against the welfare of
the child. The paramount consideration is
what is really demanded by its best interests." Since that time, courts have
recognized this standard as a guideline in
exercising judicial discretion as to who
shall gain custody of a child. By way of
example, see Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 407, 381 A.2d
1154, 1156 (1978).
In denying Quilloin's claim that Ga.
Code Ann §§ 74-203, 74-403(3) are unconstitutional, the lower court concluded
that Quilloin lacked standing to object to

the adoption because he had failed to obtain a court order granting legitimation
which would have authorized him to contest the adoption. Ga. Code Ann. §
74-103
Appealing to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, Quilloin argued that §§ 74-203,
74-403(3), as applied by the trial court to
his case, violated the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
Under Georgia law, the consent of both
parents, whether married or divorced, is
necessary to permit the adoption of a
legitimate child §74-703. However, as to
illegitimate children only the consent of
the unwed mother is needed. Quilloin
claimed that the exclusion of an unwed
father from the list of those whose consent
is required for adoption, is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. However,
according to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, "[TIhe Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment requires that all
persons be treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions. [However, it]
does not prevent classification if the distinction is based on valid state interests."
Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232,
S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). Thus, the majority of the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision on the
grounds of the "state's interest" in rearing
children in a family setting. Placing full
parental power in the mother evidences
the state's interest in favoring marriage
and the family because the father can
choose to join the family at any time. Ga.
Code Ann. §§74-101, 74-103; 238 Ga.
at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248. "Accordingly,
the court placed great credence in the fact
that adoption was sought by the child's
stepfather who was a part of the family
unit in which the child was living" 46
U.S.L.W. at 4057. The valid state interest
in rearing children outweighed the exclusion of an unwed father as one who must
consent to the adoption of the child.
Therefore, classification was a proper exercise by the Georgia lawmakers.
Quilloin also contended that the
Georgia statues took away his parental
rights without due process of law. He
relied upon the United States Supreme
Court decision of Stanley v. Illinois 405
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U.S. 645 (1971). In that case an Illinois
statutory scheme, which required a hearing and proof of unfitness before the state
assumed custody of a child of married or
divorced parents or unmarried mothers,

on the "disparate statutory treatment of
his case and that of a married father," he
claimed he was entitled as a matter of due
process and equal protection to an ab
solute veto over adoption of his child, ab-

suffice." Section 74 203 states that "the
mother of an illegitimate child shall be
entitled to the possession of the
child... Being the only recognized parent,
she may exercise all the paternal [sic]

yet required no such showing before separating a child from an unwed father, was
held unconstitutional. The Georgia
Supreme Court distinguished Quilloin v.

sent a finding of unfitness. The issue
before the Court was thus whether
Georgia's adoption laws, by denying unwed fathers the right to prevent adoption

power." To be recognized in law as the
father of an illegitimate child, one must
petition for legitimation or marry the
natural mother and recognize the child as

Walcott from Stanley v. Illinois. Stanley
was denied a hearing on his fitness as a
parent before his children were taken from

of their illegitimate children, deprive
them of due process under the 14th
Amendment and equal protection of the
law.
The Supreme Court concluded that §§

his. Ga. Code Ann. §74-101.
Public policy was a further apparent
basis for the Court's decision. Other

mother's death, the children were placed
with guardians. For all practical purposes,
the court, in finding the Illinois statutes

74-203 and 74-403(3) did not deprive
the appellant of his rights under the 14th
Amendment. The "best interest of the
child" standard would have offended appellant's due process right only if the state
had broken up a family unit of which ap-

an adoption facilitates the work of the
welfare agencies in the adoption process.
State ex rel Lewis v. Social Services of

unconstitutional was protecting a family
unit; Stanley and his children whom he

pellant was a part, without granting appellant a hearing and showing his unfit

1051 (1972). "If the consent of the father
were also required, he might refuse with-

him merely because he had never
legitimized them. He had, however, lived
with the mother of his illegitimate
children and his children for almost 18
years before the mother died. Upon the

ppo O~
nZ veUU WIL1n or 18 years.
Further, had Stanley lived in Georgia,
which recognizes common law marriages,
he would have been more than a de facto
member of the family unit and the case
would never have arisen. Quilloin v.
Walcott at 238 Ga. 233-234, 232 S.E.2d

at 249. In essence, Stanley involved
deprivation and change of custody rather
than an initial award of custody as in
Quilloin.
The Georgia Supreme Court found
Stanley not controlling and §§74 203 and
74-403(3) as not having violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment. However, a
strong dissent claimed that the majority
misconstrued Stanley v. Illinois. They said
that the Court in Stanley intended to
recognize the Due Process rights of all
fathers, not merely those who live with
their families. 238 Ga. at 234, 232 S.E.2d
at 249. Consequently, the dissent said,
"because an unwed father has due process
rights in his children, it is a denial of equal
protection to treat them differently from
other parents." Id., at 235, 232 S.E.2d at
249.
Quilloin appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1257(2) challenging the constitu
tionality of Sections 74-203 and
74-403(3) of the Georgia Code. Focusing
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oweve[, le appellant was never a

courts have recognized that provisions
denying unwed fathers the right to contest

Wisconsin and Upper Michigan 47 Wis.2d
420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1973) vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 405 U.S.

part of the family unit nor did he ever
desire to be. Conversely, the adoption by
appellee would result in legal recognition

out accepting the responsibility of fatherhood, and the state could be required to
sever his relationship before the adoption
could proceed." Quilloin v. Walcott, 238

of a family unit already in existence. In
affirming the Georgia Supreme Court, a
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court found
that the "best interest of the child" stand-

Ga. at 233, 232 S.E.2d at 248. The ma
jority of the Georgia Supreme Court also
recognized the danger of profit seeking by

ard was met by the adoption of the child
by one who had continuously supported
the child, married the child's mother, and
was expressly requested by the child to be
its father.
The Court's rejection of appellant's
claim, that excluding an unwed father
from those entitled to veto an adoption
constitutes a denial of equal protection,

the unwed father in having the adoptive
family secure his consent to the adoption.
The state interest in protecting the best
interests of the illegitimate child is a
further justification for the distinction between the interests of the unwed father
and those with authority under the
Georgia Code to contest the adoption.
The child's interests in this case were best
served by granting adoption by appellee

was based upon the existence of a valid
state interest. It suggested that the distinction between the interests of an unwed
father and those of an unwed mother (or
of the parents of legitimate children) visa-vis their right to contest an adoption, is
valid. Ga. Code Ann. §74-403(3)

and denying appellant's attempt to bar
the action. The state's interest in protecting an existing family unit providing for
the care and support of the child, is ex
tremely strong. Appellant's interest surfaced only after he received notice of appellee's petition for adoption. Quilloin's

It appears that legislative intent influenced the Supreme Court in finding a
valid distinction. In Georgia, adoption
procedures are strictly staturory in nature.

failure to provide continuous support,
visit regularly or legitimize the child, versus appellee's continuous support of the
family unit provides the basis for a valid

They give little recognition to fathers of
illegitimate children. Georgia Code Annotated §74-403(3) specifically provides
that "if the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother [to adoption] shall

distinction which serves the best interests
of the child and the state.
The Supreme Court has recognized the
rights and responsibilities that attach to
paternity. No longer can an unwed father,

who offers neither his support nor his
name, claim a right in his illegitimate
child. Rights and responsibilities of fatherhood are concomitant; an unwed father
cannot accept the right and deny the
responsibility.

Steel Corporation to work in a steel mill
in Youngstown, Ohio. The United Mine
Workers went out on stirke at all coal
mines owned by United States Steel Corporation (USS) and by Republic Steel
Corporation. These company-owned
mines supplied the fuel used in the operation of manufarturing facilities of USS and
Republic. As a result of the strike the fuel
supply at the Youngstown plant was
reduced. The plant eventually was shut

Coal Strike
Brings No
'Peace of
Mine(d)'

down and in November 1974 Hodory was
furloughed. Hodory applied to the appellant state agency for unemployment
benefits. On January 3, 1975 the appellant disallowed his claim under OHIO
REV. Code §4141.29(D)(1) (a) which provides that a worker may not receive
unemployment benefits if: "His
unemployment was due to a labor dispute
other than a lockout at any factory, establishment, or other premises located in this

by Marc Hoffman

On May 31, 1977, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided the case of
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v.
Hodory, 97 S. Ct. 1898, regarding the
asserted right of an employee furloughed
as a result of a coal strike to receive
unemployment benefits. In 1974 Leonard
Hodory was employed by United States

or any other state and owned or operated
by the employer by which he is or was last
employed; and for so long as his
unemployment is due to such labor dispute."
On January 27 Hodory filed a complaint based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the
United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf
of himself and "all others similarly
situated" who had been or in the future
would be denied benefits under
§4141.29(D)(1)(a). The court held that
the statute as applied to Hodory entitled
him to unemployment benefits. The State
appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court of the United States and in an 8-0
decision (Mr. Justice Rehnquist not participating) the Court reversed the District
Court.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the
abstention doctrine was not applicable in
this case; (2) the Ohio statute was neither
in conflict with, nor pre-empted by, the
Social Security Act or the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act; and (3) the
statute had a rational relation to a legitimate state interest and did not violate the
Equal Protection or Due Process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision as to the
abstention doctrine was based upon the
fact that the state voluntarily chose to
submit to a federal forum and principles of
comity do not demand that the federal
court force the case back into the State's
own system. 97 S.Ct. at 1904.
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